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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

广东省江门市人民政府


江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法

转发市劳动局关于请予审核发布《江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法》的请示的通知


市高新区管委会，各市、区人民政府，市府直属各单位：
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　　市劳动局《关于请予审核发布〈江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法〉的请示》(江劳法字［２０００］０３号)业经市人民政府同意，现转发给你们，请遵照执行。
江门市人民政府办公室

二○○○年十月十六日


关于请予审核发布《江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法》的请示

江劳法字［２０００］03号


市政府：
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　　目前，由于企业工资支付行为不够规范，引致企业拖欠劳动者工资情况比较严重，去年以来，我市企业发生拖欠劳动者工资案件共502宗，拖欠工资3773.9万元，被拖欠工资职工人数13039人，全市因拖欠工资引发集体上访、罢工事件共116宗，严重影响了我市的社会稳定。
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　　为了规范企业的工资支付行为，及时妥善处理企业拖欠劳动者工资问题，切实保障劳动者的合法权益，维护我市的社会稳定，创造更好的招商引资环境，我局根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》及有关劳动法律、法规的规定和参考省内兄弟市的做法，代拟订了《江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法》，现报上，请予以审核发布实施。

　　　江门市劳动局



江门市企业工资支付监控管理办法

　　第一条　为了规范企业的工资支付行为，及时妥善处理企业拖欠劳动者工资问题，切实保障劳动者的合法权益，维护社会稳定，根据《中华人民共和国劳动法》以及国家有关法律、法规、规章的规定，结合我市实际，制订本办法。
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　　第二条　本办法所指工资支付监控管理是指劳动部门依法对企业支付工资情况进行监督检查，对无故克扣和拖欠工资的行为进行制止和纠正，必要时依法予以处罚的执法行为。工资支付监控管理包括定期检查、随时抽查和专案调查等方式。
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　　第三条　工资支付监控的对象为本市范围内的企业，其中监控重点是：
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　　（一）已发生拖欠工资的企业；
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　　（二）生产经营困难，已出现拖欠租金、水电费等情况的企业；
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　　（三）固定资产投资少的劳动密集型企业；
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　　（四）租赁场地经营的企业。
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　　第四条　工资支付监控的主要内容：
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　　（一）企业必须依照《劳动法》规定以货币形式足额发放劳动者工资;
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　　（二）工资必须在企业与劳动者约定的日期支付，且每月至少支付一次；
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　　（三）企业支付给劳动者的工资不得低于江门市政府规定的最低工资标准；
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　　（四）企业应按规定发放加班工资；
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　　（五）企业不得克扣或拖欠劳动者工资。
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　　第五条　本办法由我市各级劳动部门具体组织实施。各级公安、法院、工商、经委、交委、建委、外经委、农委、财贸委、银行等有关部门和单位，按照各自职责协同实施本办法。
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　　第六条　企业招用劳动者，应依法与劳动者签订劳动合同。劳动合同应明确劳动者的工资支付办法和工资支付时间。
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　　第七条　企业应制订工资支付制度，明确工资支付的项目、水平、形式、对象、时间以及特殊情况下的工资支付。
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　　企业制定、修改、废止工资支付制度，应当事先听取企业工会或职工代表的意见，并应向劳动者公布，同时抄报当地劳动部门备案。
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　　第八条　企业应将工资支付给劳动者本人。劳动者本人因故不能领取工资时，可委托其亲属或他人代领。企业内部的承包者不得代领劳动者的工资。
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　　第九条　企业应与劳动者约定日期支付工资。如有特殊情况延期支付工资的，必须征得劳动者同意，并报告当地劳动部门。
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　　第十条　企业工资支付应当有发放单位、工资数额、发放时间、发放对象姓名及领取者签名等书面记录，且一式两份，保存两年以上备查。企业支付工资时，应向劳动者提供一份具备上述书面记录的劳动者个人工资清单。
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　　第十一条　属于本办法第三条（一）、（二）类情况的企业，由当地劳动部门通知该企业在指定期间内报审工资支付表副本。市直国有企业、集体企业报主管部门初审，初审同意后向市劳动局报审；市直其他企业直接向市劳动局报审。各市、区的报审办法，由各市区政府确定。企业逾期未能足额支付工资的，应主动向报审单位报告欠发工资情况、原因和解决办法。
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　　第十二条　企业主管部门应指定专人负责收集和初审所属企业的工资支付表副本，发现有拖欠工资的，如实填写《企业欠发劳动者工资情况表》，及时报告当地劳动部门。
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　　第十三条　企业主管部门及劳动者发现企业有下列情形之一的，应及时向当地劳动部门反映：
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　　（一）招用工后３０天内未与劳动者签订劳动合同；
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　　（二）工资未按时足额发放；
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　　（三）企业无故将机器设备、原材料、产品搬离生产场地；
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　　（四）企业停业、关闭；
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　　（五）企业法定代表人或生产经营负责人失踪。
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　　第十四条　企业支付劳动者工资情况纳入劳动年审。
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　　第十五条　劳动部门对企业支付工资情况进行监督检查时，企业应当如实介绍情况、回答提问，并提供必要的文件资料和证明。
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　　企业隐瞒事实真相、出具伪证、隐匿毁灭证据以及拒绝提供必要的资料等行为，阻挠、抗拒劳动部门监督检查的，或者打击报复举报人员的，由当地劳动部门按有关法律法规的规定，视其情节轻重，给予相应的行政处罚;构成犯罪的，交由司法机关处理。
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　　第十六条　对存在拖欠工资问题的企业，所在地劳动部门应及时介入处理，根据企业报送的工资发放原始凭证，调查核实欠薪人数和金额。用人单位有下列侵害劳动者合法权益情形之一的，由当地劳动部门依法作出《劳动行政处理决定书》责令支付劳动者的工资报酬或责令支付赔偿金：
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　　（一）克扣或者无故拖欠劳动者工资的；
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　　（二）拒不支付劳动者延长工作时间工资报酬的；
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　　（三）低于当地最低工资标准支付劳动者工资的。
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　　对拖欠工资的企业逾期既不执行《劳动行政处理决定书》，又不申请行政复议或起诉的，劳动部门可依法申请人民法院强制执行。
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　　第十七条　企业法定代表人或生产经营负责人克扣、拖欠劳动者工资后逃匿的，劳动部门应立即向当地政府报告，由当地政府责成企业主管部门或出租厂房、设备、场地的单位负责处理，先予支付所欠的劳动者的部分或全部工资，后由有关部门依法追究企业法定代表人或生产经营负责人的责任。必要时，可通过被拖欠工资的劳动者代表向人民法院申请诉前财产保全措施。
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　　第十八条　企业工资支付监控工作按照“谁主管，谁负责”的原则实行管理。各级政府要加强对这项工作的领导，各有关部门和单位要相互支持、紧密配合。如因不负责、互相推诿而造成监控不力，导致拖欠工资引发集体上访、罢工事件等影响生产秩序和社会稳定的，追究有关责任人责任；造成严重社会影响、导致重大经济损失的，依法追究相关责任。
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　　第十九条　各有关单位和工作人员对企业报送的工资支付表副本等有关资料必须严格遵守保密制度，不得向无关人员透露。
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　　第二十条　各级劳动部门的监督检查人员必须秉公执法，不得滥用职权，徇私舞弊，不得向他人泄露案情、被检查单位的商业秘密及有关的保密资料，并要为举报者保密。违法行使职权的，视情节轻重，给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，由司法机关追究其刑事责任。
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　　第二十一条　各市、区人民政府可根据本办法制定实施细则。
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　　第二十二条　本办法由市劳动局负责解释。
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　　第二十三条　本办法自印发之日起施行。